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Price and Pretense in the Baby Market 
Kimberly D. Krawiec• 
 
Few proposals generate the moral outrage engendered by a suggestion that babies 
– or, more accurately but less vividly, parental rights – should be traded on the open 
market.  More than anything else, baby selling seems to fly in the face of our deeply held 
convictions that some items are too priceless to ever be bought and sold.  Throughout the 
world, in fact, baby selling is formally prohibited.  And throughout the world babies are 
bought and sold each day.  As demonstrated in this Essay, the legal baby trade is a global 
market in which prospective parents pay, scores of intermediaries profit, and the demand 
for children is clearly differentiated by age, race, special needs, and other consumer 
preferences, with prices ranging from zero to over one hundred thousand dollars.   
Yet legal regimes and policymakers around the world pretend that the baby 
market does not exist, most notably through proscriptions against “baby selling” – 
typically defined as a prohibition against the relinquishment of parental rights in 
exchange for compensation.  As a result, fees, donations, and reimbursements take the 
place of purchase prices.  Although large sums of money change hands and many market 
intermediaries profit handsomely from the baby trade, compensation to some of society’s 
most vulnerable suppliers is legally restricted and, despite the successful addition of new 
sources of supply, the number of available “desirable” children continues to fall far short 
of demand.    
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Until recently, the most visible and contested debates regarding baby markets 
primarily addressed the normative desirability of an open-market baby exchange, largely 
assuming that formal bans against baby selling relegated the baby trade to the black and 
gray markets.  (Landes & Posner 1978; Radin 1996; Anderson 1993)  Recent analyses, 
however, persuasively document the legal, but highly imperfect, baby market, rendering 
(in some circles, at least) assertions regarding the existence of legal baby markets so 
widely accepted as to be almost mundane. (Spar 2006; Goodwin 2006; Sanger 2006; 
Ertman 2003). 
This Essay explores the costs of societal pretense that legal baby markets do not 
exist.  Those costs include scarcity, forgone opportunities to address market failures, an 
inability to develop regulations designed to further particular public policies unlikely to 
be advanced solely through the goal of profit-maximization, and the promotion of rent-
seeking.  This Essay focuses specifically on the rent-seeking problem, arguing that, 
although frequently defended by those who contend that commercial markets in parental 
rights commodify human beings, compromise individual dignity, or jeopardize 
fundamental values, bans against baby selling (at least as currently written and enforced) 
serve little purpose other than enabling anti-competitive behavior by the most 
economically and politically powerful baby market participants.  
Part I of this essay defines the baby market, demonstrating both its similarities to 
and differences from other types of commercial markets.  Part II argues that a systematic 
failure to acknowledge the full depth and breadth of the baby market extracts a high price 
from the market and its participants.  That price includes forgone opportunities to 
improve market functioning, as discussed in Part II.A., and an inability to address 
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potential tensions between public policy and collective action concerns, on the one hand, 
and market forces and individual choice, on the other hand, as discussed in Part II.B.  Part 
III, however, addresses the highest price imposed by legal pretense regarding baby 
markets – a romanticization of the baby market and its distribution networks enables 
politically and economically powerful market participants to cloak private wealth 
transfers as public-interested regulation.  Part IV concludes.  
 
I. DEFINING THE MARKET   
 
To say that a baby market exists, of course, indicates relatively little about that 
market, either normatively or descriptively.  As a descriptive matter, the baby market 
resembles other common markets in some ways and not in others.  As a normative 
matter, the baby market poses many of the standard regulatory concerns presented by 
other commercial markets, including issues arising from unequal bargaining power or 
access to information, such as fraud; anti-competitive behavior, such as price-fixing and 
barriers to market entry; and collective action problems, such as the “race to the 
courthouse” in bankruptcy. Yet the important public policy issues raised by trafficking in 
human lives suggest that the baby market raises special regulatory concerns as well.  
Understanding these similarities to, and differences from, other markets – along with the 
baby market’s unusual political dimensions – provides insight into the regulatory 
concerns raised by the baby market. 
 
A. Common Market Attributes: Industry Segmentation and Price Differentiation 
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Like many other markets, the baby trade can be divided into distinct market 
sectors.  A robust and growing commercial market exists in each of these sectors, 
including the $3 billion assisted reproductive technology (ART) industry; the “donation” 
of sperm and eggs for prices ranging from under one hundred to over one hundred 
thousand dollars; the controversial, but growing, surrogacy industry; and the adoption 
market, including the highly commercial international and private domestic adoption 
sectors.  (Spar 2005; Krawiec 2009a)  
Although the product supplied in each sector of the baby market differs – ranging 
from the hope of a future child in the ART sector to a fully-formed, already existing child 
in the adoption sector – effective regulation of the baby trade necessitates a unified, 
holistic approach to the market.  This is not to imply that a one-size-fits-all legal regime 
is suitable for the varied sectors of the baby market.  To the contrary, each market sector 
poses vastly different legal and public policy issues.  (c.f. Krawiec, 2009a)  
But because each industry sector can act as an imperfect substitute for the others, 
regulation that limits supply in one sector will channel consumers into another.   In other 
words, prospective parents determined to have a child may be forced into the next best 
substitute, say adoption, when their first reproductive choice, say ART, has been fully 
exhausted without success or becomes otherwise unavailable.  As a result, regulations 
and market failures that limit the egg trade will force prospective parents into the 
adoption market, and vice versa.  (c.f. Bartholet, pp. 9-10)  Moreover, a holistic approach 
to the baby market that encompasses each of its various sectors facilitates an analysis of 
an important commonality across those sectors  – the extent to which societal pretense 
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regarding the existence of for-profit market exchange obscures anti-competitive behavior 
by economically and politically powerful baby market participants. 
A second point of commonality between baby markets and traditional commercial 
markets is price-differentiation based on consumer preferences.  The extent of this price 
differentiation depends on the particular baby industry sector in question.  Although some 
baby market sectors exhibit relatively low levels of price differentiation based on 
perceived quality, others exhibit enormous variation.  In the gestational surrogacy market, 
for example, the surrogate bears no genetic relation to the child.  Intended parents, 
therefore, have relatively basic requirements, such as the surrogate’s willingness to live a 
healthy lifestyle and the probability that she will relinquish the child at birth.  As a result, 
although there is some price differentiation, gestational surrogacy compensation tends to 
vary within a relatively narrow range within specific geographic markets. 
Egg market pricing, in contrast, is highly differentiated according to the perceived 
genetic quality and traits of the egg “donor.”  As the market has become more 
commercial, the demand for particular genetic preferences has increased.  Although the 
base-line rate for eggs in 1999 was $2,500 to $5000, depending on geographic region, 
donors with traits that are particularly rare or desired command significantly higher 
prices. (American Society of Reproductive Medicine 2000)  For example, East Asian and 
Jewish eggs command a price premium, because they are rarer, as do the eggs of Ivy 
League college students, women with high SAT scores, women with athletic ability, and 
women with extraordinary physical attractiveness. (Krawiec 2009a) 
Similarly, the adoption sector is price differentiated based on race, age, special 
needs, and other consumer preferences.  Minority, older, and special needs children can 
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be adopted from the foster care system for prices ranging from zero to $2500, thanks to a 
variety of federal and state adoption assistance and subsidies.  The healthy, white infants 
acquired through private agency and independent adoption, by contrast, typically 
command placement fees ranging from $10,000 to $40,000, although prices as high as 
$100,000 have been reported. (Spar, 178-79) In addition, adoptive parents of these 
children frequently must pay birth parent expenses, including medical and living costs, 
legal representation, and counseling. (Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, Costs of 
Adoption)    
In the international adoption market, prospective parents can select children from 
thirty-nine different countries, each of which provides a different product and price 
structure.  For example, in China, the available children are almost exclusively girls, 
generally between the ages of ten and seventeen months.  Although Russia has both boys 
and girls available, there is a much larger supply of older children than of infants, which 
are in short supply and costly.  In Guatemala, the children are generally very young, and 
of Mayan decent.  Choosing a country, therefore, involves choosing your child’s race, 
age, and other characteristics, with prices varying accordingly. (Spar 2005) 
In summary, the exchange of parental rights operates in many ways like any other 
market.  Despite formal bans on baby selling, in the United States alone in 2001, roughly 
41,000 children were born through assisted reproduction, 6000 of whom were created 
through the use of “donated” eggs, and 600 of whom were carried by surrogates. (Spar p. 
IX)  In 2003, Americans adopted 21,616 children through international adoptions, and 
gave birth to 30,000 babies using commercially purchased sperm.  (Spar p. X)  Each of 
these children was purchased, usually at great cost.   
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B. Distinct Market Attributes: Public Policy, Inelasticity, Substitutability, and 
Consumer Desperation 
 
The baby market differs from many other commercial markets in important ways, 
however.  First, and most obviously, the fact that the “product” in question is a human 
being (or future being) raises difficult public policy issues not implicated by commercial 
exchange in other markets.  The baby market can, and should, never be identical to the 
markets for bonds, cars, or pets, and nothing in this essay is intended to suggest 
otherwise.  Nor do I mean to suggest that other regulatory goals should take precedence 
over the best interests of the children and future children traded in this market.  Yet, as 
elaborated in the section and elsewhere (Krawiec, 2009a), societal pretense regarding the 
existence of legal baby markets is not a necessary component of a legal regime that holds 
the best interests of children paramount.  Indeed, the contrary is true: pretense regarding 
legal baby markets thwarts the development of sound public policies designed to protect 
the best interests of children.   
Second, the baby market exhibits the characteristics of a market in which demand 
is inelastic with respect to price.2  Demand in the baby market often knows no limits.  For 
some prospective parents, the desire for a family is so strong that they will stop at 
virtually nothing to procure a child – they will take on a second job, mortgage their 
house, incur massive debt, deplete their savings account, and sell other assets.  In short, 
attempts to acquire a child often stop only when success is attained or access to funds 
                                                
2 The price elasticity of demand is “the percentage change in the quantity of a good demanded that results from a one percent 
change in price,” but is rarely constant across all ranges of demand and price.  (Frank 1999, p.122.)  Demand for a good is said to be 
elastic with respect to price if price elasticity is less than -1, and inelastic if price elasticity is between -1 and zero.   A variety of 
factors impact the price elasticity of demand, including: the availability of substitutes, the product’s share of total expenditures, and 
the effect of income.  (Frank, pp. 130-31)  Other commonly-invoked examples of markets in which demand is inelastic with respect to 
price include addictive and life-saving drugs.  (Tewari & Singh, p. 44; Ringel, p. 36) 
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runs out.  Although demand in the baby market is not completely price insensitive 
(customers do care about price and do purchase fewer services when prices rise), 
“frequently, people buy on hope rather than on performance, and they base their spending 
largely on their available resources.”  (Spar, p. 32)   
Third, and relatedly, for three reasons elaborated here, the role of substitutes is 
tricky in the baby market, reducing the downward price pressure created by close 
substitutions in many other markets.  First, other markets supply no suitable substitute 
products.  For most prospective parents, a puppy is not an acceptable substitute for a 
baby.   
Second, the baby market exhibits significant product differentiation across its 
various industry sectors.  As previously discussed in Part I.A., prospective parents may 
be forced into a second-best reproductive option when their first reproductive choice is 
foreclosed.  Yet such forced substitutions do not diminish the extent of product 
differentiation in the baby market.  For example, although some parents are indifferent as 
between the choice of genetic offspring and an adoptive child, others will turn to 
substitutes only when all hope of a genetic heir to one or both parents has run out.   
Third, within most baby market sectors (gestational surrogacy, as previously 
noted, being a possible exception) babies and baby-making components tend to be highly 
differentiated, even within an industry segment.  Parents desiring a healthy infant, for 
example, are unlikely to accept an older or special needs child, absent extraordinary 
circumstances.  Similarly, many parents desire – and are willing to pay a premium for – a 
child matching their own ethnic background.   
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Commentators frequently consider the level of product differentiation in 
analyzing market regulation, because the unwillingness of consumers to switch to a 
competitor’s product reduces the incentives for sellers to compete on price.  As a result, 
product differentiation increases the market power of individual sellers and can result in 
higher consumer prices.  (Viscusi, et. al., 109-112; Hovenkamp, 37).  At the same time, 
however, product differentiation may thwart some types of producer collusion, by 
complicating the ability to set prices.  (Hovenkamp, 37) 
Finally, infertile couples understandably do not view themselves as purchasing a 
baby or, perhaps, even entering into a market transaction, and their behavior as 
consumers in the baby market tends to reflect this, differing from consumer behavior in 
other types of transactions.  Prospective parents, for example, frequently do not engage in 
extensive price comparison or bargaining over fees; change providers only reluctantly, 
even when faced with a lack of success through a given provider; and behave like 
desperate parents, rather than rational consumers, when weighing their purchasing 
options.  (Spar, p.49, p. 244, n. 42.)  As discussed in Part II.B., these – and other -- 
distinct features of the baby market suggest that, despite the baby market’s many 
similarities to other commercial markets, it also poses unique regulatory issues that 
distinguish it from other markets. 
 
II. THE COSTS OF REGULATORY PRETENSE 
 
The failure to acknowledge the full breadth of the legal baby market imposes 
severe costs on the market and its participants.  Those costs include the forgone 
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opportunity to develop legal policies designed to improve the functioning of the market, 
as discussed in Part II.A., and forgone opportunities to further particular public policies 
unlikely to be advanced solely through the goal of profit-maximization, as discussed in 
Part II.B.  This is not to suggest that legal oversight is a panacea without costs of its own.  
Greater government involvement means that costs are likely to rise, some services that 
people desire may be prohibited, and certain types of customers -- for example, older 
parents, single parents, and gay and lesbian parents – risk being legislated out of the 
market.  These are the costs that must be weighed against attempts to improve the baby 
market. 
The primary focus of this Essay, however, as discussed in Part III, is not the 
forgone opportunity for the development of sound legal policies, but a failure to properly 
understand the purpose and effect of existing legal rules.   Specifically, the 
romanticization of the baby market and a failure to understand its market participants and 
distribution networks enables economically and politically powerful market actors to 
extract private benefits from the state under the guise of public interest regulation.  
 
A. Improving Market Functioning 
 
A regulatory failure to recognize markets as markets may prevent those markets 
from operating at their full potential.  As detailed in Part III, for example, the regulatory 
exclusion of many suppliers form the substantial profits shared by other baby market 
participants reduces the available supply.  
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Moreover, microeconomic theorists have identified a variety of conditions 
necessary to the competitive functioning of markets, and regulatory regimes governing 
other commercial markets frequently seek to promote those conditions.  For example, the 
legal regime may seek to reduce transaction costs, information asymmetries, externalities, 
monopolies, and barriers to the provision of public goods.  (Kreps, 193-95, 202-04, 263-
65; Knight, 9-13).  Towards those ends, some commentators have advocated disclosure-
based baby market regulations, such as those governing the securities markets 
(Goodwin).  Others have looked to the markets for luxury goods, organs, or health care 
for regulatory guidance. (Spar, pp. 217-224) Societal pretense regarding the baby 
market’s very existence, however, renders many such regulatory analogies politically 
impractical.    
 
B. Other Public Policies   
 
In addition to impeding the development of legal policies designed to ensure the 
efficient functioning of the market, the insistence on treating exchanges in an impersonal, 
profit-centered market as if they were motivated by something else – altruism or personal 
preference, for example – thwarts the development of legal rules designed to further 
particular public policies unlikely to be advanced solely through the goal of profit-
maximization.  Disparate access to the baby market, for example, implicates troubling 
issues of class and race that deserve – and largely fail to receive – the attention of 
commentators and policymakers.  Common defenses of limitations on compensation to 
birth parents, surrogates, and egg donors, for example, rest on claims that a legalized 
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baby market would convert poor and (particularly in the case of gestational surrogacy) 
minority women into handmaidens for their wealthier counterparts, and that a market 
pricing system would unambiguously highlight the extent to which Americans value 
black children less than white children.  Yet this is the reality of the baby market as it 
currently exists: women of color act as surrogates for white women with increasing 
frequency, (Spar, pp. 82-83) rarely use ARTs to redress their infertility, (Roberts pp. 250-
64) and disproportionately face the involuntary termination of parental rights.3  
Moreover, only those determinedly ignorant of the differentiated pricing in the adoption 
market could fail to appreciate the fact that Americans’ preference for white children is 
already obvious. 
At the same time, however, the anti-competitive capping of egg donor 
compensation and laws limiting birth parent compensation in the adoption market to 
reasonable living expenses primarily affects the earning power of egg donors and birth 
parents with the most highly valued genetic and other traits.  In other words, legal 
pretense regarding baby markets in these industry sectors primarily harms women who 
are attractive, white (or, in the case of the egg market, of a particularly desired ethnic 
ancestry, such as east Asian or Jewish), and intelligent.  (Krawiec, 2009a) 
In addition, technological and other baby market innovations create a potential 
tension among public policy goals, market forces, reproductive freedom, and parental 
rights that troubles many baby market observers.  For example, concerns over eugenics 
plague the sperm and egg sectors of the market, while differential access to, and the 
                                                
 3 Extrapolating from the data available from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for 2001 on the children 
whose parents have had their parental rights terminated, and assuming a similar distribution among children in foster care and parents 
whose parental rights have been terminated, suggests that black (non-Hispanic) and white parents are represented roughly equally 
among parents with involuntarily terminated parental rights (37% versus 38%, respectively), despite the greater percentage of whites 
in the population.  This extrapolation is necessary because, although statistics on children whose parents have had their parental rights 
terminated are readily available, information is not collected on the parents whose rights are terminated.  Wiley, et. al., pp. 22-23. 
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potential uses of, PGD (pre-implantation genetic diagnosis) raise other important public 
policy issues.  (Krawiec, 2009)   
To illustrate, in the absence of universal access to PGD, poor mothers may be 
more likely to give birth to a child with a genetic disease than an affluent mother, who 
can afford to have her embryos screened.  As a result, those families least able to afford 
the special needs of a child with a genetic disease may be most likely to give birth to such 
children. Moreover, because white women currently are more likely to use ARTs, 
including PGD, than are black women, if this trend continues genetic diseases may be 
disproportionately borne by racial minorities.  (Roberts pp. 250-64; Genetics and Public 
Policy Center, 2005, pp. 9-10)  
Other contested uses of PGD include embryo selection for a genetic match to an 
existing child so that the new child can be a stem cell donor; the use of PGD to screen 
embryos for adult-onset diseases, such as Alzheimer’s; and screening for mutations 
indicative of a heightened, but uncertain, risk of some diseases, such as breast cancer.  
Finally, many disability advocates worry about the potential implication of PGD that 
individuals with disabilities – many of whom lead happy, productive lives – would have 
been better off never being born.  (Hudson, pp. 1642-43)   
Non-medical uses of PGD are even more contested.  For example, gender 
selection is a quickly-growing and controversial use of PGD that is legal in the United 
States, but banned in most other countries.  (Stein)  In addition, although not currently 
scientifically possible, many scientists consider it “not completely implausible” that 
technology may someday enable parents to select other genetic advantages for their 
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children – advantages that will accrue only to those who can afford PGD. (Hudson, p. 
1642) 
These and other issues posed by the baby market may pit market forces and 
individual choice against public policy and collective action concerns because, in the 
abstract, respondents report high levels of discomfort with many of these scientific and 
market advances, including embryo purchases and the creation of customized children 
that meet the specific genetic preferences of their parents. (Genetics & Public Policy 
Institute, What America Thinks, p. 38)  But on an individual basis, parents do exactly 
what parents have always done – spend whatever is necessary to endow their families 
with the advantages that money and modern technology can provide.  As a result, many 
customers are willing to buy – and many suppliers are willing to sell – a girl to the family 
who, through natural means, has managed to produce only boys; a child that is the perfect 
donor match to a sibling dying from a fatal illness; and, if it becomes technologically 
possible, a child with straight hair, blue eyes, high SAT scores, or natural musical 
aptitude.   
The point here is not to argue for or against any of these commercial possibilities.  
But recognizing the baby trade for what it is – a market driven by profits and in which 
supply will inevitably grow to meet demand – is essential to understanding the tensions 
raised by this industry.   
 
III. BABY SELLING BANS AS RENT SEEKING 
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 As discussed in Part II, societal pretense regarding the baby market poses a price 
in the form of the lost opportunity for sound law-making.  The greater price, however, 
may be that the romanticization of the baby market obscures the impact of existing laws 
dictating the allocation of parental rights.  The most obvious incarnation of this 
regulatory pretense is the legal rule prohibiting baby selling, typically defined as a 
prohibition against the relinquishment of parental rights in exchange for compensation.  
Frequently defended by those who contend that commercial markets in parental rights 
commodify human beings, compromise individual dignity, or jeopardize fundamental 
values, such bans, in fact, have more in common with the rent-seeking by powerful 
market actors seen in other commercial markets than with normative statements about the 
sanctity of human life.4     
The notion that the government’s power to regulate may be used to provide 
private benefits by restricting market entry, policing cartels, and legitimizing price-fixing 
tactics is a phenomenon well documented in other industries.  (Stigler 1975; Macey 1986; 
Macey 2006)  In fact, Stigler argues that every industry with sufficient political power to 
harness the state’s coercive machinery will seek to use that authority to: (1) control 
market entry by new competitors and (2) police cartels and price fixing agreements.5 
(Stigler pp. 5-6, 1975)   
Baby-selling restrictions arguably serve both of these goals.  As discussed in this 
section, a wide array of fertility specialists, agents, brokers, facilitators, lawyers, and 
                                                
4 This Essay does not attempt to rehash the voluminous literature debating the expressive function of baby selling bans.  Instead, I 
argue that, even assuming that baby selling bans provide some expressive benefit, such benefits are substantially diminished by the 
reality of legal baby markets.  Moreover, such “expression” extracts a high price, by using the dialog of public interest to mask private 
wealth transfers from less powerful Baby Market Suppliers to more powerful Baby Market Intermediaries. See Krawiec (2009a) 
(discussing this at greater length.) 
5 Stigler also contends that industries with sufficient political power will seek state assistance in encouraging the production of 
complements and discouraging the production of substitutes.  Stigler at 6.  As previously noted, the role of substitutes in the baby 
market is complicated.   
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other middlemen (hereafter, “Baby Market Intermediaries”) legally profit handsomely 
from the baby market.  As public choice theory would predict, these Baby Market 
Intermediaries are more economically and politically powerful than those suppliers of 
babies and baby-making components whose market access is legally restricted. Not 
coincidentally, Baby Market Intermediaries also have agitated actively for legal and 
industry restrictions that impede the ability of birth parents, gestational surrogates, and 
egg donors (hereafter, “Baby Market Competitors”) – quite literally, the “mom and pop” 
producers of this industry -- from collecting the market clearing price for their services, 
thus reducing competition and capping the price of their required inputs. 6  Not 
surprisingly, then, supply in these sectors of the baby market frequently falls far short of 
demand. 
 
A.  Controlling Market Entry 
 
As discussed in this Part III.A., baby selling restrictions, adoption regulation, and 
legal uncertainty regarding the enforceability and payment terms of surrogacy contracts 
complicate the ability of birth parents and surrogates to collect the market clearing price 
for their services.  Such rules thus deter independent market entry, preserving the division 
of profits among established baby providers and enhancing the role of Baby Market 
Intermediaries  (particularly incumbent intermediaries, who have already established 
market position and reputational capital.) 
                                                
6 For similar arguments in the context of organ markets, see e.g. Goodwin (2006); Mahoney (2000).  For influential discussions of 
the relationship between organ selling restrictions and the organ shortage, see Cohen (1995), Hansmann (1989), and Epstein (1997), 
chs. 9-12. 
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To illustrate, the adoption sector can be broadly divided into the international and 
domestic markets.  The domestic market, in turn, has both a private component, through 
which nearly all healthy white infants available for adoption in the United States are 
placed, and a state-run (foster care) component, in which older, minority, and special 
needs children are disproportionately represented.7  Both the international sector and the 
private domestic sector are distinctly commercial.  In the private domestic market, 
adoption agencies, brokers, and facilitators typically command placement fees ranging 
from $10,000 to $40,000, although prices as high as $100,000 have been reported.  (Spar 
at 178-79)    
Similarly, the majority of international adoptions in the United States are carried 
out through licensed agencies, which, in most states, have few limits on the fees and 
expenses charged to prospective parents.  The domestic charges in international adoptions 
typically include an application fee, a home study fee, and a program fee.  Overseas 
charges include a required “donation” to the child’s orphanage, and fees to the agency’s 
facilitator, drivers, and interpreters.  These charges vary by agency and home country. 
(Spar, pp. 176-86) 
Finally, adoptive parents in international and private domestic adoptions 
frequently pay birth parent expenses, including medical and living costs, legal 
representation, and counseling. (Costs of Adoption).  However, international law, as well 
as the laws of all fifty states, forbid payments to birth parents in exchange for the 
relinquishment of parental rights.  (Spar, pp. 176-186) 
                                                
7 An estimated one-half to two-thirds of U.S.-born healthy, white infants are placed directly by birth parents with adoptive parents 
through the assistance of an intermediary, such as an attorney, doctor, clergy, or other facilitator.  Private Domestic Adoption.  
Estimates vary because states are not required to report private domestic adoptions.  Id.    The remainder are placed through for-profit 
or non-profit adoption agencies that are licensed by the state. Id. 
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A variety of murky – and manipulable – state statutes govern these adoption-
related fees.  Although no state permits “baby selling,” few states specifically cap or 
otherwise restrict permissible payments for medical, living, and other expenses of birth 
parents, allowing some latitude to those eager to evade such restrictions.  At the same 
time, because such payments must be justified as reasonable living or other expenses, the 
restriction does deter very large payments and acts as a de facto price-fixing agreement 
that may prevent particularly desirable birth parents from collecting the market clearing 
price for their services.   
In addition, nearly all states ban finders’ fees to intermediaries, but most permit 
reasonable payments to intermediaries for services rendered in connection with the 
child’s placement. (Private Domestic Adoption)  Although the level of control and 
oversight over intermediary fees can vary significantly across jurisdictions, few states 
impose specific limits on such fees, providing a similar latitude to those eager to evade 
the ban on finders’ fees.  
Baby Market Intermediaries in the adoption sector, such as state-licensed 
adoption agencies, long have sought to protect their market positions through active 
agitation for prohibitions against baby selling, with exceptions for their own activities.  
(Zelizer, pp. 169-207; Spar, pp. 166-171; Landes & Posner, pp. 346-47)   Those efforts 
have met with mixed success in restricting market entry by private agencies and brokers 
that enjoy the political support of lawmakers, whose constituents value the larger supply 
and shorter waiting times associated with private adoption.  (Zelizer, pp. 196-207) These 
anti-competitive efforts, however, have been quite successful against birth parents 
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desiring to profit from the baby trade, nearly all of whom are funneled into the baby trade 
through a Baby Market Intermediary, rather than as direct suppliers.  
Finally, legal uncertainty regarding the enforceability of surrogacy contracts and 
the permissibility of surrogacy payment terms in many jurisdictions channels some 
parents into less risky sectors of the baby market, causes those that remain in the 
surrogacy sector to charge a risk premium for the surrogate’s risk of non-performance, 
and enhances the role of intermediaries (particularly incumbent intermediaries) whose 
reputations and profits depend on the repeated delivery of surrogates who will perform 
under the terms of the contract.  (Sanger)  The effect of each of these outcomes is to 
stymie the direct provision of surrogacy services and deter independent market entry. 
 
B.  Cartelization and Price Fixing 
 
As discussed in Part III.A., legal bans on baby-selling that prevent compensation 
to birth parents for the relinquishment of parental rights while permitting Baby Market 
Intermediaries free reign in setting placement fees and other expenses make independent 
entry into the baby market less attractive for many Baby Market Competitors, thus 
restricting market entry.  Less obviously, as discussed in this Part III.B., the insistence 
that Baby Market Competitors are, and should be, motivated primarily by altruism rather 
than by profit enables explicit and implicit price-fixing by Baby Market Intermediaries 
seeking to cap the price of their inputs.  This produces two related results: (1) 
inefficiently low supply and high consumer prices, and (2) distributional concerns 
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stemming from the distorted division of profits between Baby Market Intermediary and 
Competitor.   
When babies, eggs, or the use of a womb are characterized as donative or 
altruistic transfers from a Baby Market Competitor, rather than as inputs into the final 
product (a child) offered for sale by Baby Market Intermediaries, it is easy to overlook 
the fact that such intermediaries have an economic interest in artificially depressing the 
price of that input.  Of course, capping input prices reduces the available supply for both 
Baby Market Intermediaries and consumers.  As in the traditional oligopsony model, 
however, Baby Market Intermediaries accept reduced access to inputs in exchange for a 
lower purchase price.8  In other words, assuming that the marginal cost of any unit of a 
good is the price paid on all prior units, an oligopsonist will fail to purchase some units 
whose value to the oligopsonist exceeds their costs, in order to cap the purchase price of 
prior units.  (Boal & Ransom)  As a consequence, oligopsony power (like oligopoly 
power) produces inefficient supply levels.  (Hovenkamp, p.14; Boal & Ransom)  The end 
result, as seen in all sectors of the baby market, is product scarcity.  More difficult to 
observe – but inherent in the oligopsony model – is the distorted division of profits 
between producer (Baby Market Competitor) and middleman (Baby Market 
Intermediary) produced by baby selling restrictions. 
Confusion regarding the economic effects of monopsony markets has sometimes 
led courts and policymakers to conclude that monopsony is not a concern of anti-trust 
law, which seeks a goal of low consumer prices.  (Balmoral; Kartell)  Such an approach, 
however, incorrectly assumes that the savings from low input prices in a monopsony 
                                                
8 The phrase “monopsony,” meaning a single buyer, was first coined by Joan Robinson (Robinson, p.215) Given that single-buyer 
models are unrealistic as applied to modern markets, economists instead employ models of oligopsony or “competitive monopsony,” 
in which buyer market power persists despite competition among buyers.  The phrase “oligopsony” refers to the market power of 
buyers and not their number, which need not be small.  (Bhaskar, et. al. p. 156) 
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market will be passed on to consumers.  Instead, a monopsonist who sells into a 
competitive market will charge consumers the same price as a non-monopsonist, but will 
supply a lower amount of the good.  In contrast, a monopsonist buyer who also enjoys 
monopoly (or cartel) power over consumers will sell to consumers at a higher price than a 
non-monopsonist.9  (Hovenkamp, pp. 14-15) Monopsony markets, therefore, never 
benefit consumers, and create a deadweight efficiency loss, as do monopoly markets, 
because some market actors engage in a second-choice transaction that produces less 
social value than their first choice.10 (Hovenkamp, pp. 19-20)  
This intuition has been employed in a growing body of work in labor economics, 
which posits that – in contrast to competitive employment models that assume a mass 
exodus of employees if the employer cuts wages -- employers may enjoy significant 
market power over their workers in some cases.  (Card & Krueger, 1995; Card & Krueger 
2000; Manning; Neumark and Wascher, 2000) That market power may derive from a 
variety of sources, including employer differentiation, moving costs, job search costs, an 
inability of rival employers to absorb additional employees quickly, and – most relevant 
for the baby market – employer collusion. (Bhaksar, et. al., p. 160) 
Although empirical research documents numerous examples of collusion attempts 
(both successful and unsuccessful) (Levenstein & Suslow), cartels are, in fact, difficult to 
organize and even more difficult to maintain.  Incentive problems encourage cheating 
among cartel members and the possibility of super-normal profits encourage new market 
entrants, who compete with and destabilize the existing cartel. (Stigler, 1971; Grossman, 
pp.1-4; Baumol & Blinder, p. 294)  Consequently, successful cartels must have a credible 
                                                
9 As noted in Part III.A., legal restrictions and uncertainties impose a variety of barriers to entering the baby market, creating 
market power among industry incumbents. 
10 A difficulty with antitrust analyses of monopsony markets, however, is distinguishing low input purchase prices stemming from 
monopsony, versus those stemming from reduced transaction costs or the elimination of upstream market power.  Hovenkamp, p. 16. 
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enforcement mechanism to punish defectors, and a mechanism for preventing new market 
entrants, who would eat up any cartel profits. (Stigler,1964;Grossman, p.2)  Legal rules 
can – and in the case of baby markets do – decrease the private costs of cartel formation 
and enforcement, and of policing market entry.  (Stigler, 1964; Tilton)   
As previously discussed, baby selling restrictions perform this input capping 
function of the buyers’ cartel in the adoption and surrogacy sectors of the baby market.  
In the egg industry, input price capping is accomplished instead through explicit price 
fixing agreements in the form of professional standards. (Krawiec, 2009b)  Yet the anti-
competitive nature of these agreements rarely elicits comment or controversy, perhaps 
because the persistent dialog of altruism and donation that characterizes the egg business 
distracts observers from the true nature of the industry.   
For example, the ASRM Ethics Committee Report recommending caps for 
financial incentives to egg donors, together with the published list of egg donor agencies 
that have signed an agreement with the Society for Reproductive Technology (SART) 
agreeing to abide by the Committee’s recommendations governing egg donor payments, 
closely resemble the same types of price fixing agreements that have been deemed per se 
illegal in other industries.  (American Society for Reproductive Medicine 2000; ASRM, 
List of Egg Donor Agencies; Krawiec, 2009b) Similarly, fertility clinics and doctors 
would likely not be so forthcoming in discussing with the press their informal attempts to 
limit prices paid for eggs in the New York metropolitan area, if they were given a reason 
to fear the reactions of policymakers and the public. (Mahoney, p. 187; American 
Radioworks)   
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Ironically, such legal rules and the anti-competitive behavior that they enable are 
frequently defended as a means of preventing the commodification and 
commercialization of human beings, womens’ labor, or motherhood. (Radin 1996; 
Anderson 1993; Walzer 1983; Shanley 2001)  As demonstrated, however, the costs of 
these rules are borne primarily by Baby Market Competitors, who are disproportionately 
young, female, and in financial need.11  The benefits, meanwhile, are disproportionately 
enjoyed by wealthier and more politically powerful Baby Market Intermediaries.   
Similar arguments have been made regarding the perverse effects of the ban against 
unconscionable contracts (Epstein 1975), protective women’s labor laws (Novkov 2001; 
Bernstein 2003), and laws and rhetoric opposing the commodification of women’s, 
particularly poor women’s, labor. (Case, Cahn 2001; Silbaugh 1996; Williams 2000) 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Commentators and policy makers have spent much time romanticizing or ignoring 
the baby market, and fretting over an impending commercialization or commodification 
that, in fact, took place long ago. In today’s legal regime, rules prohibiting baby selling 
have little to do with grand normative statements about sacred values and, instead, 
accomplish little more than impeding market access by baby producers.   
Societal pretense regarding the baby market is exhibited most clearly by the ban 
against baby selling.  As demonstrated in this Essay, this supposed ban merely prevents 
full compensation to certain suppliers and does not (and is not designed to) prevent 
                                                
11 “Financial need” should not be interpreted as synonymous with poor, although some Baby Market Suppliers – for example, 
birth parents in the international adoption market – may be poor.  But many egg donors, in contrast, are college students anxious to 
earn extra money to defray educational or other expenses.  Krawiec, 2009a 
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commercial transactions in children.  Therein lies the harmful hypocrisy of baby selling 
“bans.”  Were Americans serious about its refusal to attach price tags to children, the law 
would ban all commercial transactions in babies, rather than merely restricting 
compensation to Baby Market Competitors.   
But baby market critics should not delude themselves about either the probability 
or the costs of a real baby selling ban.  First, a true baby market ban would entail high 
costs.  As demonstrated by the experience of those countries that have eliminated 
commercial exchange in some sectors of the baby trade, were the United States 
successfully to prohibit commercial transactions in children, supply in the baby market 
would be even further reduced.  (Krawiec, 2009a)  
Second, banning the baby market is politically infeasible in the United States.  
Consumer demand is simply too strong and too deeply felt, and unlikely to be sated 
through substitutes outside of the baby market.  In addition, baby market consumers and 
intermediaries are too economically and politically powerful, and have too much at stake 
in the baby market to permit its abandonment.   
Perhaps, in the absence of a sufficient number of healthy, white, infants, 
prospective parents would be forced into the only sector of the baby trade that, sadly, 
does not suffer from a shortage of supply – the state-run foster care system, through 
which a disproportionate number of older, minority, and special needs children are 
available.  Such substitutions arguably have positive effects, such as providing homes to 
children who otherwise would remain in state care, or altering American norms about 
what constitutes a desirable child.  Cross-racial adoptions, however, are controversial for 
a variety of reasons, and many child advocates worry about promoting through scarcity 
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the adoption of special needs children by parents who are ill-equipped to handle the 
challenges.   
This Essay encourages the recognition of the baby trade for what it is – a market, 
with similarities to and differences from, other markets.  As with other markets, the legal 
regime may seek to improve competitive conditions, and should be suspicious of attempts 
to use the state’s power to extract private benefits under the guise of public-interest 
regulation.  Trafficking in human lives, however, poses some public policy issues that 
may be best addressed by political forces, rather than by market ones.  Pretending that 
legal baby markets don’t exist accomplishes none of these objectives.   
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